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ABSTRACT: Recently, there have been several well-publicized cases in which a 
patient in need of a transplant has solicited an organ through the use of 
commercial advertising and organized media campaigns. When deceased organs 
are directed to an individual as a result of solicitation rather than allocated 
through the national system, equity and medical utility are sacrificed.  For this 
reason, regulation of deceased organ solicitation may be desirable.  However, 
because solicitation of organs is likely to be considered constitutionally protected 
charitable speech, there are significant legal issues to consider. This article 
analyzes the legality of four possible policy options to resolve the ethical dilemma 
raised by solicitation of deceased organs for transplant.   
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3I. Introduction:
The idea of a patient in need of a transplant using the media to secure an organ is 
not novel - potential recipients and their advocates have been appealing directly to the 
public for specific organ donations as far back as the early 1980’s.1 However, recently 
there have been several well-publicized cases in which a potential recipient has solicited 
an organ for transplantation through the use of commercial advertising.  In August 2004, 
Todd Krampitz received a liver donation after advertising through billboards, e-mails, the 
internet, and by launching an extensive media campaign.2 A donor family had responded 
to these efforts by requesting that their deceased relative’s liver go to Krampitz.3 On 
October 20, 2004, the first known organ donation in the U.S. to be arranged through a 
commercial website took place when Robert Smitty donated a kidney to Robert Hickey, 
whom Smitty had found through MatchingDonors.com.4 Hickey had paid the website a 
monthly fee of $250 to advertise for a donor.5 In July of 2005, a highly publicized 
media campaign was launched on behalf of Shari Kurzrok, a gravely ill New York public 
 
1 Lainie Friedman Ross, Media Appeals for Directed Altruistic Living Liver Donations: Lessons from 
Camilo Sandoval Ewen, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 329, 330-331 (2002) (In 1982, Charles 
Fiske, a health care executive, pleaded to a ballroom full of doctors to help him find a liver for his infant 
daughter, and in 1983, President Reagan made a public appeal on his weekly radio address on behalf 
Ashley Bailey, an infant).  However, these early cases do not raise the same ethical concerns that exist 
today as discussed below, in part because transplants were rare and in part because Congress did not create 
the national organ allocation system until 1984.  In fact, some would say that the national system was 
created as a result of Charles Fiske’s public appeals.  See infra text accompanying notes 136-139.   
2 Christopher Snowbeck, Publicity Campaigns Seeking Organ Donations Raise Ethics Questions,
Headlines & Deadlines (newsletter of the Pa. Newsp. Assn.), ¶ 2  (August 27, 2004), 
http://www.headlinesanddeadlines.org/2004/Aug_27_04/organ_donors.html.
3 Id. at ¶ 3.  
4 Arthur Caplan, Organs.com: New Commercially Brokered Organ Transfers Raise Questions, Hastings 
Ctr. Rep., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 8, 8.      
5 Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8; but see MatchingDonors.com, 
http://www.matchingdonors.com/life/index.cfm?page=services&CFID=79334&CFTOKEN=55949044 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (requesting that those who cannot afford membership call for a free membership 
code).  About 70% of the patients with active profiles are being listed without charge.  Robert Steinbrook, 
Public Solicitation of Organ Donors, 353 N. Engl. J. Med. 441, 442 (2005).   
4relations executive in need of a liver transplant.6 Although Kurzrok ultimately received a 
liver transplant through the established national system, this case together with the 
Krampitz and Hickey cases heightened public attention about organ solicitation and 
raised significant concerns about fairness, utility and the adequacy of the current donation 
and transplant system.   
All three of these recent cases involved solicitation of organs for transplant into a 
specific patient.  This is referred to as “directed donation” meaning that the donor (or his 
or her family) directs donation of a specific organ to a specific recipient.  The Smitty case 
is an example of a directed donation in the living donor context.  Smitty agreed to donate 
one of his kidneys to a specified recipient.  The Krampitz and Kurzrok cases are 
examples of solicitation for directed donation in the deceased context.  The liver donation 
being solicited in both cases would come from a deceased donor.   
In both the living and deceased donor contexts, directed donations to strangers are 
rare.  The overwhelming majority of deceased donations are not directed donations.  
Instead, donated deceased organs are allocated to anonymous recipients through the 
United Network for Organ Sharing (hereafter “UNOS”) system.7 In those rare cases 
when a deceased donor’s family directs a donation, it is usually to another family 
member or an individual with which the donor or family has a personal bond.8 In 
comparison, directed donations are the norm among living donors.  Two thirds of living 
 
6 See Daily News, July 27, 2005.  See also Deborah L. Shelton, Debate Over Appeals for Organs Heats Up,
St. Louis Post Dispatch, Aug. 23, 2005, at ¶ 7, available at 
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/fortwayne/12453164.htm.
7 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (hereafter “OPTN”), Request for Public Input 
Regarding OPTN/UNOS Facilitation of Living Unrelated Kidney Donation: Appendixes, at 6, 
http://www.optn.org/PublicComment/pubcommentPropExhibit_21.pdf.
8Id.
5donations are directed to biological relatives and many of the rest donate to a spouse.9
Still, only a handful of living donations have been publicly reported in which the donor 
and recipient met solely for the purpose of donation and had no preexisting relationship 
before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first identified.10 
Over the past couple of years, however, public donor solicitations resulting in 
directed donations to strangers are increasing.  MatchingDonors.com alone has facilitated 
more than a dozen transplant surgeries between living donors and recipients who were 
strangers before the donation.  Dozens more are reportedly in the presurgery stage, and 
Matchingdonors.com has over 2400 potential donors registered on its website to whom 
potential recipients can appeal.11 The intensity of donor solicitations may be increasing 
as well, as evidenced by the Kurzrok campaign which allegedly resorted to posting flyers 
in hospitals asking families to direct a liver donation to Kurzrok, tracking trauma patients 
in emergency rooms, and urging police and emergency medical workers to identify 
accident victims who might serve as donors.12 Another interesting development is the 
increasingly complex forms that organ solicitations are taking.  One website (with over 
3,200 members) offers a reciprocal sharing agreement whereby members pledge to direct 
their organs in the event of their death first to other members if a suitable match can be 
found before donating to the UNOS waiting list.13 
Federal law does not prohibit directed donation to an individual and most states 
expressly permit it by statute under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which governs 
 
9 Id at 2. 
10 Id  (UNOS does not collect data on how often this occurs). 
11 Rob Stein, Search for Transplant Organs Becomes a Becomes a Web Free-for-All, Washington Post, 
September 23, 2005, at A01 ¶ 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092201901.html; MatchingDonors.com.    
12 Id at 6; see also Deborah L. Shelton, Debate Over Appeals for Organs Heats Up, St. Louis Post 
Dispatch, Aug. 23, 2005, at ¶ 7, available at http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/fortwayne/12453164.htm.
13 LifeSharers, http://Lifesharers.com (last visited October 11, 2005).   
6organ donation.14 Federal regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (hereafter “HHS”) expressly permit directed donations.15 Despite the 
current legality of directing a donation to a solicitor, many commentators consider this 
practice unethical, particularly in the deceased context.  This is because directed donation 
allows a potential recipient to effectively “jump the line” by soliciting the donation of an 
organ that otherwise might have been allocated to a recipient ranked higher on the UNOS 
national waiting list.16 The UNOS organ allocation policies are designed to balance 
equity for potential recipients with medical utility.  Preferences are given according to 
certain equitable factors such as time spent on the waiting list and medical urgency.17 
The allocation process is designed to accomplish utility by using clinical factors to 
distribute organs to recipients who are expected to realize the greatest clinical benefit in 
terms of survival.18 Because these allocation policies are applied uniformly, potential 
recipients compete equally for organs, receiving preferences only according to these 
factors.    
Solicitations for deceased donor directed donations bypass this system and may 
therefore unfairly give preference to “attractive patients” with greater means of 
purchasing advertising or drawing media attention.19 There is, however, a recognized 
competing autonomy interest in allowing a donor or donor family to choose who will 
 
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 273-274 (2005); Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a)(3) (amended  1987); but see Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 18 § 5242(a), (d) (2005) (allowing only living donors to make a directed donation).   
15 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(h) (2005). 
16 Geoff Drushel, Directed organ donation is legal, but is it right? Hepatitis Mag., Jan.–Mar. 2005, at ¶ 6-
8, available at http://www.hepatitismag.com/storydetail.asp?storyid=133 (quoting Arthur Caplan).   
17 OPTN, Policies 3.2.1.7-3.2.1.7.9, 3.5.5.,  http://www.optn.org/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp (revised 
Nov. 19, 2004). Note that whether the potential recipient has been a living organ donor in the past is 
considered. 
18 Id. at Policy 3.5.3.3.1. 
19 Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8.     
7receive their anatomical gift by directing the donation.20 Some have argued that donor 
solicitations are consistent with utility principles because they may increase total 
donations (especially in the context of living donor solicitation), thereby benefiting all 
potential recipients by moving successful solicitors off of the national waiting list.21 
This article analyzes the legality of four possible policy options to resolve the 
ethical dilemma raised by solicitation of organs for trnasplant. Expedient resolution of 
this issue is critical given that there are over 90,000 potential recipients listed on the 
UNOS waiting list and that 4,856 patients from this list died in 2005 while awaiting an 
organ for transplant.22 
II. Should public organ donor solicitations be restricted at all?  
a. Solicitation of deceased organ donations should be restricted to maintain 
equity and medical utility in the organ allocation system.
Directed donation creates a conflict between distributive justice and donor 
autonomy.23 The UNOS allocation policies serve principles of distributive justice by 
balancing equitable factors such as time spent on the waiting list and medical urgency 
with medical utility factors that measure which potential recipients will realize the 
greatest clinical benefit from a particular organ.24 This system “levels the playing field” 
and allows potential recipients to compete equally, giving preferences only according to 
these equitable and medical factors.  Solicitations bypass this carefully crafted system 
because they encourage selection of potential recipients outside of the established equity 
 
20 Mark D. Fox, When an Organ Donor Names the Recipient, Am. J. Nursing, July 1996, at 66, 66.   
21 Christopher Robertson, Organ Advertising: Desperate Patients Solicit Volunteers, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 
170, 172 (2005).   
22 OPTN, Data Reports, http://www.optn.org/latestData/viewDataReports.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).    
23 Fox, Am. J. Nursing at 66.   
24 See supra notes 18-19.   
8and utility factors.  However, solicitations for directed donations serve to maximize a 
competing interest, donor autonomy.   
 The autonomy interest in directing an organ donation is often compared to the 
autonomy interest in directing material wealth to a specific individual or organization 
through one’s will.25 Proponents of donor solicitation believe that this interest outweighs 
society’s interest in medical utility.  They also believe that solicitations will increase the 
total number of organ donations by persuading people who otherwise would not donate to 
do so.26 By analogy, if one could not direct monetary donations to the charity of one’s 
choice, total charitable donations would arguably decline.27 If a solicitation causes an 
organ donation that otherwise would not have happened, patients listed below the 
solicitor on the national waiting list would benefit from the solicitor receiving a 
transplant because that individual would then move off the list, and patients listed above 
the solicitor would be unaffected.  Each deceased donation caused by solicitation may 
also have a collateral effect on medical utility because a deceased donor usually donates 
multiple organs resulting in multiple recipients receiving transplants.28 
It is unlikely, however, that the autonomy interest in donating to a solicitor is 
what motivated state legislators to pass the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (hereinafter the 
“UAGA”) which permits directed donation.  The framers of the UAGA did not 
contemplate directed donations arranged through solicitations and made in the absence of 
 
25 Cite DAN BROCK in Symposium issue; and Klaus D Teichmann, Directed Tissue Donations, 33 
Clinical and Experimental Ophthalmology 112 (2005).   
26 Robertson, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics at 172.   
27 Aaron Spital, Must Kidney Donation by Living Strangers be Nondirected?, 72 Transplantation 966 
(2001).   
28 The national average in 2005 was 2.79 organs transplanted per deceased organ donor.  See UNOS 
website. 
9any preexisting relationship between the donor and the designated recipient.29 Instead, 
the directed donation provision in the UAGA was designed to permit families to donate 
needed organs to another family member awaiting transplant.30 The autonomy interest at 
stake in directing a donation to a stranger is clearly distinguishable from and not nearly as 
great as the interest that one has in directing a donation to a family member or close 
friend.  
 Furthermore, a donated organ is not a private gift similar to wealth devised 
through a will because transplantation requires greater cooperation from people other 
than the donor and intended recipient in order to effectuate the gift.31 In this way, organ 
donations can be characterized as social gifts and therefore society may be justified in 
limiting a donor’s autonomy in order to promote equity among potential recipients and 
ensure that the full utility of the gift is realized.32 
The likely outcome of continuing to allow public solicitations of deceased organs 
is that deceased organs that might otherwise be made available would be withheld from 
those patients ranked higher than the solicitor on the UNOS waiting list.33 It is unknown 
whether organ solicitations increase total donations, but donors of deceased organs who 
direct donations to solicitors are likely to have donated anyway.34 Thus, solicitors may 
move ahead of those who have waited longer, would benefit more, or have more critical 
 
29 E-mail from Blair L. Sadler (a drafter of the UAGA), President and CEO, Children's Hospital and Health 
Center, to author, (Dec. 13, 2005, 13:40:00 EST) (on file with author); Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 9-10 
(quoting R. Patrick Wood); Sheldon Zink & Stacey L. Wertlieb, Examining the Potential Exploitation of 
UNOS Policies, Am. J. Bioethics, July-Aug. 2005, at 6, 8. 
30 Id. 
31 Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social Context, Hastings Ctr. 
Rep., Sept-Oct. 1989, at 10, 11.       
32 Id. at 11-13. See also Dan Brock, Harvard Symposium (2005). 
33 Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 7-8 (quoting Arthur Caplan).   
34 See Alvin Powell, HMS examines ethics of Internet organ donation, Harv. U. Gaz., May 19, 2005, at ¶ 22    
(quoting Dan Brock), available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/05.19/09-organ.html, (it is 
unknown whether public organ solicitation increases total donations). 
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need.35 Case in point, Todd Krampitz did not meet the UNOS listing criteria because he 
had metastatic cancer, and died just eight months after receiving transplantation of the 
liver he solicited.36 
Also, not all policies that might increase total donations are desirable, as is shown 
by the fact that most nations ban the purchase and sale of organs.37 Organ solicitations 
could undermine public support for the entire procurement and allocation system because 
this practice inequitably favors those patients with “attractiveness” and the means to 
purchase advertising or draw media attention.38 An appeal for a six-month old infant in 
need of a liver donation tugs on potential donors’ heartstrings, while the same appeal 
from a middle-aged alcoholic may not, unless the individual happens to be a national 
hero.39 Organ solicitations imply that that the solicitor is ethically special compared to 
other potential recipients, and invite donors to choose recipients that appear more 
deserving rather than those in greater need or who will benefit the most medically.40 
Thus, public solicitations of deceased organ donors are likely to reduce both the 
equity and efficiency (as measured by medical utility) of the organ allocation system.  
Lawmakers, UNOS, and healthcare providers should therefore consider limiting or 
prohibiting deceased donor solicitations.   
 
35 Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 7-8 (quoting Arthur Caplan). 
36 Zink, Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS Policies, Am. J. Bioethics, at 6; Sheldon Zink & 
Stacey L. Wertlieb, Response to Commentators on “Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS 
Policies”, Am. J. Bioethics, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at W15, available at 
http://www.bioethics.net/journal/j_articles.php?aid=842.
37 Andrew H. Barnett, Roger D. Blair, & David L Kaserman, Improving Organ Donation: Compensation 
versus Markets, in The Ethics of Organ Transplants: The Current Debate, 209, 209-212, (Arthur L. Caplan 
& Daniel H. Coelho eds., Prometheus Books 1998) (Arguing that donor compensation would increase total 
donations); Ross, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine at 333.    
38 Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8. 
39 Ross, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine at 333. 
40 Kluge, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 12.   
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b. Solicitation of living donations should be permitted because they increase 
total donations without sacrificing equity and medical utility. 
There is currently no national system for allocating organs from living donors and 
no organized waiting list for potential recipients as there is for deceased organs.41 Thus, 
the effect of a solicited donation from a living donor is significantly different.  A living 
donation to a solicitor is far less likely to deprive any potential recipient of an organ that 
he or she would otherwise have received.42 Instead, a directed living donation takes the 
solicitor off the waiting list for deceased organs or eliminates the solicitor’s need to go on 
the list to begin with, thereby benefiting the patients that are or would have been listed 
below the solicitor.  Additionally, the data supports a conclusion that solicitation will 
likely increase living donations because living donors prefer to donate to a person they 
know.43 “Please donate your kidney” will never elicit the same response as “Please 
donate your kidney to Robert Hickey.”44 For example, a media appeal in Canada on 
behalf of a specific recipient resulted in 50 calls to transplant centers from people wishing 
to be living donors, when transplant centers normally only receive a few such calls a 
month.45 
Living donors do sometimes donate without specifying a recipient.  In those 
instances, the donated organ goes through a local matching system to a patient on the 
UNOS waiting list.46 Accordingly, it is possible that a solicitor may receive an organ 
from living donors that would have been allocated to a different recipient on the UNOS 
list.  However, anonymous, non-directed donations to the waiting list from living donors, 
 
41 Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 6 (quoting Arthur Caplan). 
42 Id.
43 Supra note 9 at 2; see also Jacob M. Appel, Organ Solicitation On the Internet: Every Man for Himself? 
Hastings Ctr. Rep., May-June 2005, at 14, 15. 
44 See id.
45 Ross, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine at 332.  
46 See e.g. New England Kidney Exchange at www.nepke.org; OPTN, supra note 8, at 4. 
12
called “Good Samaritan donations,” are rare.  Only 87 transplants of organs from living 
altruistic donors were performed nationwide in 2004.47 
Good Samaritan donations are rare because of an important distinction between 
donation in the living and deceased contexts; the living donor’s significant personal 
sacrifice.  Unlike a deceased donor or a deceased donor’s family, a living donor must 
bear the personal health risks of invasive surgery and living without the donated organ.  
In comparison to solicited deceased donors who likely would have donated anyway, most 
solicited living donors would likely not have donated unless they could direct their 
donation to the solicitor.  Thus, permitting solicitation of living donors is more likely to 
increase total organ donations that otherwise would not have occurred.  This is a benefit 
to the entire organ donation and transplantation system. 
 The serious sacrifice made by living donors is also significant to evaluating the 
donor’s autonomy interest in directing a donation.  A living donor makes a far greater 
personal sacrifice than a deceased donor and, unlike the deceased donor, may also 
experience some benefit through forming a personal bond with the recipient after 
transplantation.  As a result, one may argue that society should give the donor’s 
autonomy interest more weight in the living context than in the deceased context. 
 It remains true that “attractive patients” and those with greater means of 
purchasing advertising or drawing media attention will inevitably be more successful at 
soliciting living donors.48 Also, there is a possible added inequity in the living context 
because federal law permits payment of reasonable compensation for the living donor’s 
 
47 Id. at 2.     
48 Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8. 
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travel expenses and lost wages associated with living donation.49 A solicitor who has the 
financial means to reimburse a living donor for these costs may be more likely to 
successfully solicit a living donor.  In one recent case, these expenses included a stay in a 
luxury hotel and totaled $5,000, a sum that not all solicitors can afford.50 
The existence of possible inequities may not justify prohibiting living donations 
directed to solicitors as they do in the case of deceased donation. The over-riding 
consideration is that solicitations of living donors are more likely to increase total organ 
donations.  Increasing the total number of living organ donations is more likely to benefit 
other potential recipients rather than to deprive them of organs that they otherwise might 
have received.  There is no system for living donation carefully crafted to maximize 
equity and efficiency that donor solicitations would disrupt.  Also, the living donor’s 
autonomy interest in directing a donation deserves more significant weight given the 
personal sacrifice involved.  Lawmakers, UNOS, and healthcare providers should, 
therefore, continue to permit solicitations of living donors and directed donations made 
by living donors to solicitors. 
 
III. Legal Analysis of Organ Donor Solicitations as Constitutionally Protected 
Speech
Regardless of how deceased organ donor solicitations are classified, they are 
protected free speech under the first amendment of the United States Constitution.  An 
outright government ban on deceased organ donor solicitations would, therefore, clearly 
be unconstitutional.  Certain reasonable regulations may, however, pass constitutional 
scrutiny depending on the level of legal scrutiny that applies.     
 
49 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).   Although the deceased donor does not incur travel costs or lost wages, the costs 
associated with a deceased donation are never born by the donor family. 
50 Appel, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 14. 
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a. Protection for Charitable Solicitations: Strict Scrutiny Review
It is settled law that charitable organizations that solicit gifts or financial 
contributions are protected under the first amendment.51 Charitable appeals are protected 
free speech because they involve a variety of speech interests such as communication of 
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of 
causes.52 Additionally, charitable solicitation is characteristically intertwined with 
informative speech promoting economic, political, and social issues.53 Although the 
Supreme Court has not specifically considered whether an individual solicitor seeking 
private charity is protected under the first amendment, circuit courts have found no 
meaningful distinction between soliciting for oneself versus soliciting for a charitable 
organization because both forms of speech contain social messages.54 
The Supreme Court applies the most exacting level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, to 
any regulation that restricts protected speech on the basis of its content.55 To meet strict 
scrutiny, any regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and must 
be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.56 
In contrast, commercial speech receives only intermediate protection under the 
first amendment.  The courts have not, however, treated charitable solicitation as 
commercial speech.  Speech is considered commercial when it is primarily related to the 
economic interests of the speaker, or is primarily concerned with providing information 
 
51 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env., 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).   
52 Id.
53 Id. 
54 Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903-904 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that even panhandling is protected 
free speech because it may contain social messages on the issue of poverty).    
55 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-642 (1994).  
56 Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (U.S., 1987).   
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about the costs of goods and services or proposing a commercial transaction.57 For 
example, a contraceptive manufacturer that mails advertisements for its products engages 
in commercial speech despite the fact that the communication contains information on 
issues such as venereal disease and family planning.58 Here it can be inferred that the 
manufacturer’s primary purpose was not disseminating information on venereal disease 
and family planning.  This is because the communication took the form of an 
advertisement for a specific product and was motivated by an economic interest, 
(soliciting a commercial transaction).59 
Applying this test to charitable solicitation, the Supreme Court has found that 
charitable solicitations are not commercial speech.60 This is because they are concerned 
with more than just the economic interests of the speaker, providing cost information 
about goods and services, or proposing a commercial transaction. They are intertwined 
with informative speech advancing economic, political, and social issues.61 
Courts distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech on the basis 
of the content of the message itself, not the mode in which the speaker transmits it.  
Speech that is otherwise considered noncommercial does not become commercial merely 
because its speaker delivers the message in a paid advertisement.62 For example, in 
considering whether a newspaper committed libel for running a paid advertisement, the 
Supreme Court held that whether the newspaper was paid for the advertisement was 
 
57 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632; C. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980);   
 Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).     
58 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983). 
59 Id. 
60 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.   
61 Id. 
62 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-515 (U.S., 1981) (the court treated messages 
conveyed on billboards as noncommercial on the basis of their content even though they were paid 
advertisements).  
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irrelevant in determining whether it had engaged in commercial speech.63 “To hold 
otherwise would convert virtually all books, newspapers, and magazines into commercial 
speech [merely because the printer was paid], and call into question the traditional 
protections afforded these types of publications.”64 In fact, the Supreme Court has 
clarified that a speaker may even hire canvassers to promote a noncommercial message 
without engaging in commercial speech.65 The first amendment protects the right not 
only to advocate a cause, but also to select the most effective means for doing so.66 
b. Intrusive Charitable Solicitations: Reasonableness Standard
More intrusive charitable solicitations, such as those requesting funds, are subject 
to reasonable regulation.67 For example, courts have reasoned that solicitations of funds 
on a public street are intrusive because the solicitor and others watch and may exert 
social pressure on the person solicited, who may then have to stop on a busy street and 
open his wallet.68 This type of solicitation is considered more intrusive than solicitations 
that merely involve the distribution of literature.69 Of course, even the most benign 
solicitations can be considered intrusive and therefore subject to reasonable regulation in 
certain circumstances;  the first amendment would not require a city to permit a man with 
a communicable disease to distribute leaflets on public streets.70 
63 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
64 U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1208 (D. Colo. 2001). 
65 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 (1988) (the court found that paid petition circulators engaged in 
noncommercial speech because the content of the speech itself was noncommercial).   
66 Id at 424. 
67 Schaumburg , 444 U.S. at 632.   
68 U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (1990). 
69 Id.
70 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).   
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The reasonableness standard is considerably easier for the government to meet 
than the strict scrutiny standard.  To be reasonable, a regulation must appropriately 
balance legitimate government interests against the right to free speech and cannot be 
overly broad.71 For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Government’s 
legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations, (such as burglars posing as 
canvassers), justifies the reasonable requirement that canvassers register with a town 
prior to canvassing and establish their identity and affiliation with the organization they 
represent.72 
c. Organ Donor Solicitations are Charitable Solicitations
Nonprofit organizations such as MatchingDonors.com that solicit donors are 
likely to be considered protected under the first amendment as charitable solicitors 
because their services promote the social issue of organ donation by encouraging organ 
donations in the broader context.73 An individual organ solicitor is also likely to be 
protected under the first Amendment because the solicitation promotes the social issue of 
organ donation generally.  For example, the appeals on behalf of Todd Krampitz always 
contained broader requests for people to donate organs, and after he received a directed 
donation, the family put up a new billboard that said “Thank You” and encouraged more 
people to donate organs for transplant.74 
Deceased organ donor solicitations are likely to be considered noncommercial 
speech because they are not primarily concerned with providing information about the 
 
71 Watchtower Bible and Tract Socy. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002).   
72 Id. at 162-163.  
73 MatchingDonors.com is now a nonprofit organization.  Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Corporate Database Listing for MATCHINGDONORS.ORG, INC., 
http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/corp/corpsearch/CorpSearchSummary.asp?ReadFromDB=True&UpdateAllowed
=&FEIN=000891332, (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (listing MATCHINGDONORS.ORG, INC. as a 
nonprofit organization). 
74 Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 4; Snowbeck, Headlines & Deadlines at ¶ 32.  
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costs of goods and services or proposing a commercial transaction, nor are they primarily 
related to the economic interests of the organ solicitor.  They are primarily concerned 
with obtaining a life saving gift from potential deceased donors and promoting the social 
message that more people should donate life-saving organs.  Although made in the form 
of an advertisement, these solicitations make no reference to a specific product or to the 
costs of goods or services, and, at least on their face, do not propose a commercial 
transaction.  
A for-profit corporation that posts paid solicitations for organ donors may not be 
considered to have engaged in commercial speech either because the content of the 
solicitor’s message itself is not commercial.  Such a corporation would be treated and 
protected like a newspaper that is paid to print constitutionally protected 
advertisements.75 Even if a corporation were actively soliciting organ donors on behalf 
of its clients, it would still not be engaging in commercial speech because the clients’ 
noncommercial messages are not made commercial merely because they took the form of 
a paid advertisement or because the clients paid others to present them.76 Here, the 
corporation would be treated and protected like canvassers paid to promote a speaker’s 
political message.77 Again, the first amendment protects not only the solicitor’s right to 
communicate his message, but also the right to select the most effective means for doing 
so.78 
d. Reasonable Regulation of Intrusive Deceased Organ Donor Solicitations 
75 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266. 
76 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 514-515. 
77 See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426.    
78 Id at 424. 
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 Whether a court subjects regulations of deceased organ donor solicitations to the 
strict scrutiny standard or the reasonableness standard of review will depend on how 
intrusive the particular solicitations involved are.  If a particular solicitation is found not 
to be intrusive, any regulation of it would have to satisfy strict scrutiny by being 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  
Examples of less intrusive solicitations may include informative media reports, the 
general posting of an organ donation request in a public place or the internet, and the 
LifeSharers website, which invites members to agree to direct their organs in the event of 
their death first to other members if a suitable match can be found (a reciprocal sharing 
agreement).79 In these cases, the solicitor does not physically approach anyone and the 
person solicited is free to ignore the solicitation with no consequence.  Then again, in the 
case of posting requests in a public place or the internet, it is possible to argue that the 
intrusive part of the solicitation occurs later, when the person solicited contacts the 
solicitor to discuss the details.   
If a particular type of solicitation is not considered intrusive, an outright 
government ban is unlikely to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard of review.  The 
government might argue that banning deceased organ donation solicitations is necessary 
to achieve its primary objects of preserving equity and medical utility through the current 
system.  However, there is no empirical data to show that deceased organ solicitations 
will harm the national organ allocation system or to refute the counter-argument that 
 
79 LifeSharers, http://www.lifesharers.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).  Membership in an organization such 
as LifeSharers is also protected by the first amendment right to freedom of association.   See Scales v. U.S.,
367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (explaining that the government can only prohibit membership in a group if there 
is specific intent to further a group’s illegal activities).  However, there is no statutory right to direct a 
donation to a class of people because statutes define directed donation as donation to a “designated 
individual.”  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a)(3).  Thus, it is unclear whether a court would uphold the 
right to direct a donation to members of the organization generally rather than to a specific individual.   
20
solicitations may increase total donations.80 Thus, it would be difficult for the 
government to show that an outright ban on deceased organ donation solicitations is 
“necessary” to accomplish those goals.  Other less restrictive measures may be possible 
as discussed below. 
Deceased organ solicitations that can fairly be characterized as intrusive could be 
subject to reasonable regulation.  Because society values donated organs as a scare 
resource and because of the personal and physical nature of an organ donation, deceased 
organ solicitations are likely to be considered at least as intrusive as solicitations for 
funds.81 Certainly deceased organ solicitations involving direct contact with emergency 
workers or hospital staff or where there is an in-person solicitation of a potential donor or 
donor family are likely to be considered intrusive.82 Moreover, the government has 
several legitimate interests in regulating deceased organ solicitations.  First, it has an 
interest in promoting equitable and efficient allocation of deceased organs.  Second, it has 
an interest in preventing solicitors from putting undue emotional pressure on potential 
donors or donor families or misrepresenting their condition.83 Finally, it has an interest in 
preventing solicitors from inappropriately offering to purchase organs from donors, 
which is a federal offense.84 
80 See Powell, Harv. U. Gaz. at ¶ 22 (quoting Dan Brock).  
81 See discussion of the extreme sacrifice a living organ donor makes supra Part I.2.   
82 Of course, restrictions against such extreme forms of donor solicitation would probably meet the strict 
scrutiny standard as well.   Nevertheless, the reasonableness standard is likely to be applied to any 
restriction on solicitations in hospitals even without a showing that the solicitation is intrusive because a 
hospital is not a traditional public forum intended to promote the free exchange of ideas.  See Intl. Socy. for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (U.S. 1992).  This distinction could be important for a 
solicitation such as a flyer posted in a hospital, which might not be considered intrusive and its regulation 
therefore might otherwise be subject to strict scrutiny rather than the reasonableness standard of review.   
83 Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8. 
84 See infra note 103 (the sale of organs is illegal).   
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To be reasonable, any restriction must balance the right to free speech with these 
legitimate interests.  Reasonable restrictions may include requirements that deceased 
organ solicitors establish their identity, present only truthful information regarding the 
potential recipient’s condition and use non-coercive language.  Restrictions on the time, 
place, and manner of deceased organ solicitation, (such as a prohibition on solicitations in 
a hospital) are also reasonable.  It may even be reasonable to require deceased organ 
solicitations to carry a disclaimer that UNOS does not support deceased directed 
donations to solicitors, and the URL for a website containing information on the issue to 
dissuade such donations.  All of these restrictions on deceased organ solicitation are 
likely to be considered reasonable if such a standard applies.  However, an outright ban 
on deceased donor solicitation is unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge that it is 
an unreasonable restriction because it would not adequately balance government interests 
with the right to free speech.   Thus, while Congress and states cannot outright ban 
deceased organ donor solicitations, they may be able to pass reasonable regulations on 
intrusive deceased organ solicitations.   
e. Organ Donor Solicitations are Protected Even if Characterized as 
Commercial Speech.
Although it receives less protection than other forms of speech, commercial 
speech is still protected under the first amendment.85 The government may only restrict 
commercial speech if the speech presents deceptive information or if the restriction 
directly advances a substantial government interest and is not excessive.86 To assert that 
 
85 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765-766 (1993).   
86 Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-565.   
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a restriction advances a substantial interest, the government must show that there are real 
harms that the restriction will alleviate to a material degree.87 
For commercial solicitations, the government can meet its burden in showing that 
the restriction will alleviate real harms if it is reasonable to presume that more often than 
not, the solicitations are injurious to the person solicited.88 For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that a state may prohibit lawyers from soliciting clients in-person because 
lawyers are trained in the art of persuasion and are capable of convincing an injured and 
distressed lay person into placing trust in the lawyer regardless of the lawyer’s 
qualifications or the individual’s actual need for legal representation.89 Also, the Court 
stated that the lawyer’s solicitation itself may cause distress to the layperson at the time 
of injury.90 Thus, the Supreme Court found that it is reasonable to presume that more 
often than not, in-person solicitations by lawyers are injurious to the person solicited.91 
In contrast, the Supreme Court struck down a state ban on personal solicitations by 
certified public accounts because it is not reasonable to presume that such solicitations 
are injurious to the person solicited more often than not.92 The court reasoned that 
accountants are not trained in the art of persuasion and the clients they solicit are 
sophisticated business executives who can choose when and where to meet them.93 
In the case of commercial deceased organ donor solicitation, it is unlikely that the 
government could show that a flat ban advances a substantial interest and is not 
excessive.  The government has legitimate interests such as preventing solicitors from 
 
87 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-771.   
88 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 776; Ohralik v. Ohio St. B. Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978).   
89 Ohralik., 436 U.S. at 465.   
90 Id. at 466.   
91 Id.
92 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 776. 
93 Id. at 775-776.   
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coercing donors and donor families, preventing them from presenting deceptive 
information, and preventing them from offering payment for organs (a federal offense).94 
It may be difficult, however, for the government to show that the solicitations are 
injurious to the person solicited more often than not.  In the deceased context, the primary 
harm of organ solicitations for directed donations is to other potential transplant 
recipients.  This possible harm to other potential recipients results from donors exercising 
their statutory right to direct organ donations, and not directly from the solicitation itself.  
There may also be some emotional harm to the donor’s family if the solicitation is 
insensitive, offensive, or intrusive.  A deceased organ solicitation made by one skilled in 
the art of persuasion at a hospital or at the donor’s time of death may be injurious in the 
same way a lawyer’s solicitation of an injured and distressed client is.  Still, an outright 
ban would likely be considered excessive because in most other contexts, these 
solicitations will not be injurious to donors or donor families more often than not.95 
The government has a legitimate interest in preventing the harm to other potential 
recipients that would occur if deceased organ donor solicitations prevent the equitable 
and efficient allocation of organs.  Nevertheless, the government is unlikely to meet its 
burden of showing that a ban would alleviate a real harm to the national allocation system 
because there is no direct evidence to refute the counterargument that solicitations will 
 
94 See supra text accompanying notes 81-83 (discussing these legitimate government interests).     
 
95 In the living context, there is an argument that living donors are always harmed when they donate an 
organ. Yet this is balanced by the argument that living donors may benefit by knowing that they have saved 
or improved a life. Thus, it is not reasonable to presume that living donor solicitations will harm living 
donors more often than not and therefore unlikely that the government could show that a ban would 
alleviate a real harm to living donors.  Also, a ban on living donor solicitations would be considered 
excessive because living donors can be protected through the informed consent process. 
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increase total donations.96 Thus, at least at the present time, it would be difficult for the 
government to show that a ban would advance the substantial interest of preventing harm 
to the national organ allocation system.   
Therefore, even if deceased organ solicitations could be classified as commercial 
speech, it is unlikely that an outright ban would withstand a constitutional challenge.  
Nevertheless, other restrictions would be constitutional if they restrict deceptive 
solicitations or advance a substantial interest and are not excessive.  Potential regulations 
include those discussed above in the previous section as reasonable regulations of more 
intrusive charitable solicitations. 
IV. Policy Options to Restrict Deceased Organ Donor Solicitations
a. Banning Deceased Organ Donor Solicitations is Not Legally Viable.
The government may ban speech that incites illegal activity if the speech is 
directed toward producing imminent illegal action and is likely to succeed.97 To show 
that speech is directed toward producing illegal action, the government must show that 
the speaker had intent to produce illegal action.98 A ban on speech that incites illegal 
activity must only apply to speech that satisfies this intent requirement.99 Otherwise, 
courts will consider the ban overly broad because it will apply to constitutionally 
protected speech as well and will cause individuals to refrain from protected speech for 
fear of criminal sanctions.100 Thus, a ban on speech that incites illegal activity must be 
 
96 See Powell, Harv. U. Gaz. at ¶ 22 (quoting Dan Brock).   
97 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).   
98 Id.
99 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-521 (1972); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-448. 
100 Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520-521. 
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narrowly drawn to apply only to cases where the speaker intended to produce illegal 
activity.101 
Although directed organ donation is legal, federal law and most state laws 
prohibit the purchase and sale of human organs.102 Even where state law does not 
prohibit selling organs, federal law is controlling.103 After Robert Hickey’s transplant, 
suspicions ran high that he paid Robert Smitty for his kidney.  This was based on the fact 
that Smitty was arrested days after the transplant for failure to pay child support, and 
anonymous benefactors posted the funds necessary for his release.104 Additionally, 
MatchingDonors.com admits that its clients have been barraged with requests for cash 
from potential donors.105 
Nevertheless, these events are not enough to justify a ban on organ donor 
solicitations as incitement of illegal activity.  Absent a showing that a specific organ 
solicitor intended to pay for an organ, a solicitation cannot be characterized as incitement 
of illegal activity.  An outright ban on organ solicitation would be considered overly 
broad because it would apply to many cases in which a solicitor did not intend to pay for 
an organ, and would thus infringe constitutionally protected speech.  A ban may only 
survive a constitutional challenge if it is narrowly drawn to apply only where a solicitor 
intends to offer payment.  Thus, the government cannot outright ban organ solicitations 
as incitement of illegal activity.      
 
101 Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520-521; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-448. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (It is illegal to sell an organ for valuable consideration); but see Unif. Anatomical 
Gift Act § 10 (prohibiting payment only for deceased organs); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 1-14 (2005) 
(with no prohibition on payment at all).   
103 Roderick T. Chen, Organ Allocation and the States: Can the State Restrict Broader Organ Sharing?, 49 
Duke L.J. 261, 288, (1999) (explaining that Congress validly enacted the National Organ Transplant Act 
(hereafter “NOTA”) under its power to regulate interstate commerce because organ procurement, 
allocation, and transplantation necessarily involves interstate commerce).   
104 Robertson, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics at 170.     
105 Stein, Washington Post at ¶ 28-29.   
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b. Restricting Transplants for Solicitors of Deceased Organs.
After Robert Hickey received his transplant, St. Luke’s, the University of 
Colorado hospital that performed the transplant, issued a moratorium on transplants for 
internet-matched living donation pairs.106 Since then, hundreds of other hospitals 
nationwide have followed suit.107 If legally permissible, these policies could effectively 
prevent directed donations made to solicitors in both the living and deceased contexts.  
Such policies raise the issue of common law liability for patient abandonment, but 
transplant centers can take steps to protect themselves.     
 Transplant centers and surgeons owe a common law duty to their patients to 
continue providing care until their services are no longer needed, or are dispensed with 
by the patient.108 Once a physician/patient relationship is initiated, a healthcare provider 
is liable for abandonment if it withdraws from providing care without giving reasonable 
notice so that the patient may secure other medical care, and if an injury results.109 
Patient abandonment gives rise to liability for both negligence and breach of contract 
claims.110 
Patient abandonment liability exists for breach of contract because the provider 
has unilaterally terminated the physician/patient relationship.111 And, patient 
abandonment liability for negligence exists because the provider has breached its duty by 
choosing not to provide the patient with professional services at the pertinent standard of 
 
106 Bill Scanlon, Kidney Transplant a ‘Success’, Rocky Mountain News, June 10, 2005, at ¶ 15, available 
at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/0,1299,DRMN_15_3847091,00.html.
107 Id.
108 Tierney v. Univ. of Mich. Regents, 257 Mich. App. 681, 684 (2003). 
109 Id. at 684-685. 
110 Smith v. Lerner, 387 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Iowa 1986) (citing Angela R. Holder, Medical Malpractice Law 
374, 377 (2d Ed., 1978)). 
111 Id. 
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care.112 This differs from ordinary negligence in that the provider consciously chooses 
not to provide appropriate services, rather than fails to meet the standard due to 
carelessness.113 An abandonment claim fails if the provider gives reasonable notice of 
withdrawing services or if the physician/patient relationship is terminated by mutual 
consent.114 
Additionally, an abandonment claim should fail if the provider has not assumed a 
duty of care for the patient.  Thus, it may be possible to forestall an abandonment claim 
by limiting the scope of the physician/patient relationship before the provider assumes a 
duty of care for the patient.  The physician/patient relationship is essentially a contractual 
one, and providers have the right to contractually limit the scope of services that they will 
provide patients with when they assume care.115 Although such a contract might appear 
to be an adhesion contract at first blush (because the provider presents it on a “take it or 
leave it basis” and the patient lacks bargaining power), courts have distinguished between 
contracts limiting the scope of services to be provided and contracts limiting the patient’s 
right to sue for negligence, and have only voided the latter as adhesion contracts contrary 
to public policy.116 
112 Smith, 387 N.W.2d at 579 (citing Holder).  The pertinent standard of care is met when a physician 
renders professional services consistent with that objectively ascertained minimally acceptable competence 
he may be expected to apply given the qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself out as 
possessing and given the circumstances of the particular case.  Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 
1985). 
113 Smith, 387 N.W.2d at 579 (citing Holder). 
114 Dickie v. Graves, 9 Kan. App. 2d 1, 3 (1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (a),(b), comment (c) 
(1965) (in tort, an actor is not liable for terminating services unless his failure to provide services increases 
the risk of harm or the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance.  This is not met if the provider gives 
reasonable notice for the patient to find care elsewhere, or if the patient agrees to termination).   
115 See Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 392-393 (1981) (finding that a teaching clinic can require 
patients to waive their right to insist on complete treatment, but cannot require them to waive their right to 
sue for negligence if the clinic fails to meet the standard of care required by statute).   
116 See Id. 
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 There are no provisions in the National Organ Transplant Act (hereafter 
“NOTA”) or state anatomical gift statutes that abrogate a provider’s common law duty 
not to abandon.117 Nevertheless, it is likely that transplant surgeons could establish a 
policy of refusing to perform a transplant for a solicitor of deceased organ donors without 
exposing itself to abandonment liability.  A provider can discharge a patient from care 
and give reasonable notice for the patient to obtain care at another transplant center if it 
discovers that a patient is soliciting for a deceased organ donation.    
 However, if the transplant surgeon does not discover that the patient has solicited 
until a directed donation of an organ from a deceased donor is made, it is unlikely to be 
able to give reasonable notice because deceased organs must be transplanted within 
hours.118 Still, transplant surgeons may be able to protect themselves from liability even 
in this situation by informing potential recipients of their policies against facilitating 
transplants of deceased organs that have been directed through solicitation.  Appropriate 
notice of such a policy must occur before a physician/patient relationship is established 
and should be acknowledged and consented to by prospective patients.119 This could be 
accomplished by having prospective patients agree up front that the transplant surgeon is 
not accepting a duty to transplant deceased organs that are directed as a result of 
solicitation and consent to termination of care if the center discovers that the patient has 
solicited.  Such a policy is consistent with a provider’s right to contractually limit the 
scope of care provided.  Faced with a breach of contract claim or a negligence claim, a 
 
117 See Daniel G. Jardine, Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals’ and Organ Procurement Organizations’ 
Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1655, 1669 (1990) (arguing that there is negligence 
liability for rejecting donations directed to a particular race or class of people because doing so will 
foreseeably result in harm to potential recipients).   
118 Robert M. Veatch, Transplantation Ethics, 367 (Georgetown U. Press 2000).   
119 Assuming that the transplant center feels strongly enough against donor solicitation to refuse care and 
allow the directed organ to go to waste. 
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provider should be able to argue that it never accepted a contract or assumed a duty to 
treat the patient under these circumstances, and that there is mutual consent to 
termination because the patient has agreed in advance to termination of care in the event 
that the patient solicited deceased organ donations. 
 There is precedent establishing that agreements limiting the scope of care to be 
provided are not adhesion contracts.120 Also, such policies are not likely to increase 
organ wastage, as Organ Procurement Organizations (hereafter “OPOs”) might 
effectively dissuade directed donations to solicitors by informing donor families of 
transplant surgeons’ policies against transplanting solicited deceased organs.121 
c. Refusing to Facilitate Certain Directed Donations.    
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) are defined by federal regulation as 
nonprofit entities that coordinate the consent, recovery, and allocation of organs from 
deceased donors through the UNOS system.122 All parties involved in organ 
transplantations from deceased donors depend on OPO personnel to facilitate donation.  
Since the federal government designates only one OPO per geographical region with no 
 
120 See Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. at 392-393.  Even in the face of such a challenge, a provider 
could argue that such contracts support rather than undermine public policy by preserving the integrity of 
the national organ allocation system.   
121 Interestingly, if the OPTN or Congress decided to ban these moratoriums on the grounds that refusing 
these transplants wastes organs, this would likely be a valid exercise of authority under either Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce or its spending power.  However, it is unlikely that the federal 
government would enact such a policy given the fact that the OPTN publicly opposes directed donation to 
solicitors.  See infra text accompanying notes 136-142.  It would appear also that state legislatures could 
amend their anatomical gift statutes to ban such moratoriums under their police power.  However, such a 
law might be overturned for infringing a physician’s due process right to not enter a physician/patient 
relationship, a right that courts have generally upheld outside of the emergency care context.  See Hiser v. 
Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 610 (1980) (a medical provider is free to contract for his services as he sees fit 
and can refuse to treat a patient even under emergency situations), overruled by Thompson v. Sun City 
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 603 (1984) (holding that hospitals cannot deny emergency care without a 
valid cause).   
122 42 C.F.R. § 486.302, 486.306. 
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overlap, an OPO policy of refusing to facilitate deceased directed donations made to 
solicitors would effectively prevent deceased donors and their families within that OPO’s 
region from making such donations.123 
In order to avoid any appearance that the federal government is somehow 
indirectly prohibiting protected free speech (OPOs are not government entities but do 
receive Medicare funding), such a policy could be written as a refusal to accept and 
procure donations directed to any recipient with whom the deceased donor has not had a 
preexisting relationship with before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first 
identified.124 Such a policy should reduce any potential OPO liability because there is no 
established duty in statute or common law for an OPO to facilitate any particular directed 
donation.125 
Laws that permit directed donation allow a donor or donor family to designate an 
individual recipient for donation; they do not require the donee (often the OPO) to accept 
the donation and facilitate its allocation for transplant.126 In fact, state anatomical gift 
statutes expressly preserve a donee’s right to reject an anatomical gift.127 Thus, these 
laws do not grant either the donor or the designated recipient the right to conscript an 
OPO to aid him in removing the organ.128 
123 Id. at § 486.316. 
124 See discussion infra Part II.3.B.   
125 But see Colavito; [add cite] 
126 See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a)(3).   
127 Id. at § 7(a): “A donee may accept or reject an anatomical gift.”  
128 Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 245-246 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that a designated recipient of a deceased directed donation did not have an action against an OPO 
which allocated one of the donor’s kidneys to another recipient, leaving the plaintiff with only one kidney, 
which was untransplantable).  The court found that the state anatomical gift statute was ambiguous with 
respect to a designated recipient’s rights.  It then weighed the OPO’s interests in equitably and efficiently 
allocating organs against the interest of a designated recipient of a directed donation, and found that the 
OPO’s interest precluded a private right of recovery for damages for the designated recipient. UPDATE 
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It is true that federal regulations require OPOs to conduct systematic efforts to 
acquire all usable organs from potential deceased donors and avoid organ wastage.129 
However, federal regulations also require OPOs to have a system for equitably allocating 
donated organs among transplant patients.130 Thus, an OPO may argue that by refusing 
to facilitate deceased donations directed in the absence of a preexisting relationship it is 
fulfilling its other statutory duty to equitably allocate donated organs.  It may also argue 
that such a policy fulfills its duty to acquire all usable organs more broadly by protecting 
the integrity of the entire allocation system.   
Under common law, the conclusion is the same.  An OPO owes no legal duty to 
designated recipients of directed donations because it never initiates or enters into a 
physician/patient relationship with these potential recipients and so never assumes a duty 
of care toward them.131 In spite of this, some have argued that an OPO assumes a duty to 
procure deceased organs for potential recipients by rendering services that it should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of potential recipients, (a gratuitous 
undertaking).132 
An entity only assumes a duty of care through a gratuitous undertaking if its 
failure to exercise care increases the risk of the harm or if the harm suffered is because of 
the other’s reliance.133 An OPO that refuses to facilitate a directed donation does not 
increase the designated recipient’s risk beyond the risk that would exist if the OPO had 
not rendered any services at all.  Also, the harm suffered by the designated recipient 
 
129 42 C.F.R. § 486.306(g)(2). 
130 Id. at § 486.306(i). 
131 See discussion supra Part II.2.A.   
132 Jardine, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. at 1669 (1990) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323) (arguing that 
there is negligence liability for rejecting donations directed to a particular race or class of people because 
doing so will foreseeably result in harm to potential recipients).     
133 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323.   
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cannot be caused by reliance on the OPO if the OPO policy is made public.  Moreover, 
even if a common law duty could be found, it is possible to argue that federal regulations 
and state anatomical gift statutes abrogate this duty by preserving a donee’s right to reject 
any anatomical gift and by requiring OPOs to equitably allocate organs.134 Thus, there is 
no legal duty for OPOs to facilitate directed donations made in the absence of a 
preexisting relationship between the donor and the designated recipient, and OPOs can 
refuse to facilitate such donations without incurring liability.   
 
d. OPTN Policy Prohibiting Facilitation of Certain Directed Donations.  
In 1984, Congress authorized the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (hereafter “OPTN”) to set national organ allocation policies through NOTA.135 
This broad grant of authority is supported by Congress’s spending power and its power to 
regulate interstate commerce.136 NOTA requires the Secretary of HHS to contract with a 
private nonprofit organization to maintain the OPTN, but leaves the authority to set 
allocation policies with the OPTN.137 UNOS has held this contract and maintained the 
OPTN since 1986.138 
134 Note however, that if an OPO does endeavor to coordinate a directed donation it may be held liable for 
fulfilling that undertaking.  Cite Colavito. 
135 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2): “The [OPTN] shall – (A) establish in one location or through regional centers -- 
(i) a national list of individuals who need organs, and (ii) a national system, through the use of computers 
and in accordance with established medical criteria, to match organs and individuals included in the list, . . . 
. (B) establish membership criteria and medical criteria for allocating organs….”   
136 42 U.S.C. § 273 (granting the Secretary of HHS the authority to make grants to organ procurement 
organizations); Chen, 49 Duke L.J. at 288 (explaining that Congress validly enacted NOTA under its power 
to regulate interstate commerce because organ procurement, allocation, and transplantation necessarily 
involves interstate commerce).  
137 Chen, 49 Duke L.J. at 280. 
138 Id. at 266.   
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 Hospitals that perform organ transplants must maintain membership with the OPTN 
in order to receive access to organs from the OPTN/UNOS system and receive federal 
Medicare funding.139 Thus, the OPTN can enforce its policies by denying membership 
and access to organs from its system to transplant centers that do not comply.  The 
Secretary of HHS can support OPTN policies by cutting federal Medicare funding for 
transplant centers and OPOs that do not comply.140 Because the OPTN has broad 
Congressional authority to set national allocation policies and the power to set policies 
that transplant centers in all 50 states must abide by, an OPTN policy against organ donor 
solicitations may be the most politically expedient solution to the issue.  So far, the 
OPTN Board of Directors has adopted a statement opposing public solicitations of 
deceased organs and has established a committee to examine the issue in both the living 
and deceased contexts, but has not amended its allocation policies.141 
It would appear that the OPTN has the authority to adopt a policy prohibiting its 
members from allowing patients to solicit organs.  There are two potential ways to draft 
such a policy, both of which could apply to deceased donations.  The first option would 
prohibit members from facilitating transplants for any recipient that has solicited, 
regardless of whether or not the recipient obtained a directed donation.   The second 
possibility would be to only prohibit members from transplanting or procuring organs 
that were directed to the recipient as a result of a solicitation.  To support either policy, 
 
139 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(b) (membership with the OPTN is a Medicare condition of participation for hospitals 
that perform organ transplants); 42 C.F.R. § 121.9(a) (1)(participation in Medicare is required in order to 
receive organs from the OPTN); see supra note 136 (the OPTN has authority to set national allocation 
policies).   
140 See supra notes 137, 140.  
141 UNOS News Bureau, OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors Statement Regarding Solicitation of Deceased 
Donation, http://www.optn.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=374 (Nov. 19, 2004); OPTN, 
http://www.optn.org/members/committeesDetail.asp?ID=64 (last visited October 11, 2005) (the OPTN has 
created an ad hoc committee on public solicitation).  
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the OPTN and HHS would deny access to organs from the OPTN/UNOS system and 
Medicare funding to members that are in violation.  However, neither policy is likely to 
pass a constitutional challenge because both policies infringe protected free speech. 
i. The Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine
Under the unconstitutional condition doctrine, the government may not withhold 
valuable government benefits that would otherwise be available because an individual 
has exercised a constitutionally protected right, such as the right to free speech.142 The 
government may not condition a benefit on the abstention from a protected right even if 
the individual has no fundamental right to receive the benefit.143 For example, a state 
university cannot deny a non-tenured professor continued employment because he 
exercised his constitutional right to publicly criticize the university, even though the 
professor has no fundamental right to employment at the University.144 The government 
may not use conditional benefits to indirectly restrict a constitutional right that it could 
not directly restrict.145 
Of course, the government can selectively choose which programs to subsidize, and 
does not infringe a constitutional right merely by choosing not to subsidize the exercise 
of that right.146 For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
regulation that prohibited recipients of federal funds for family-planning services from 
providing counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method for family-planning.147 
The Supreme Court found that the government was not conditioning funds that would 
 
142 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).   
143 Id. at 594-595.   
144 Id. at 587. 
145 Id.
146 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991).   
147 Id. at 179.   
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otherwise be available on the funding recipients forgoing a constitutional right; it was 
merely choosing to subsidize certain forms of counseling at the exclusion of others.148 
However, government funding decisions based on abstentions from protected 
speech are only upheld in situations where the government is itself the speaker or has 
used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program.149 When the 
government distributes public funds to private entities to convey a governmental 
message, it may take appropriate steps to ensure that the message is not distorted by the 
grantee.150 This was the case in Rust, because the Court characterized the recipients of 
the funding as entities chosen by the government to transmit the government’s chosen 
family-planning message.151 
ii. Directing OPTN Members to Prohibit Solicitation Creates an 
Unconstitutional Condition
In the case of an OPTN policy against its members facilitating transplants for any 
recipient that has solicited, the government would be acting through the OPTN to 
condition valuable government benefits that would otherwise be available to potential 
recipients, on the condition that potential recipients forgo their constitutional rights.  
Potential recipients would have to abstain from exercising their first amendment right to 
solicit organ donations in order to receive access to organs from the OPTN/UNOS system 
and transplantations from Medicare funded centers.152 If constitutional, such a policy 
 
148 Id.
149 Leg. Serv. Corp. v. Velaquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).   
150 Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).   
151 Velaquez, 531 U.S. at 541; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173.   
152 See discussion of the first amendment right to solicit supra Part II.1. A.  
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would allow the government to indirectly do what it cannot do directly: prohibit speech 
that solicits organ donations.153 
Although transplant centers with membership in the OPTN may be characterized as 
private entities that the OPTN uses to transmit information about its own programs, it is 
not these centers that the OPTN would be forcing to forgo constitutional rights.  Instead, 
the OPTN would prohibit potential recipients from exercising their constitutional rights, 
and these patients are neither government speakers nor entities used by the government to 
transmit information.  Thus, an OPTN policy prohibiting its members from facilitating 
transplants for recipients that have solicited is unlikely to withstand constitutional 
challenge.   
 Similarly, in the case of the more narrow policy of prohibiting members from 
transplanting or procuring solicited organs, the government would be acting through the 
OPTN to condition valuable government benefits on the condition that potential 
recipients forgo their constitutional right to speech.  The OPTN would be denying 
recipients the ability to receive transplantation of directed organs at Medicare funded 
centers that would otherwise be available, on the basis of whether or not the recipient has 
solicited.      
 On the other hand, recipients would not be directly penalized for exercising their 
right to solicit because they would still have access to non-solicited organs from the 
OPTN/UNOS system and transplantations of these organs at Medicare funded centers, 
regardless of whether they have ever solicited.  Additionally, it is possible to argue that 
the speech itself is not being directly or indirectly regulated, because patients are not 
 
153 Id.
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coerced to forgo their constitutional right to solicit.  Instead, they are denied a benefit that 
they may not have even if they remained silent.  
 However, the OPTN would still be conditioning benefits that would otherwise be 
available on whether the designated recipient has exercised his right of free speech.   For 
each directed donation, members would have to determine whether the donation was 
solicited.  If the named recipient did not solicit the donation, the transplantation could go 
forward.  If the recipient did solicit, transplantation of the directed donation could not 
proceed.  Thus, the OPTN would be denying the recipient a government benefit that 
would otherwise be available; transplantation at a Medicare funded hospital involving a 
directed organ, because that recipient had exercised a constitutional right.    
 Furthermore, this less restrictive policy cannot be defended on the grounds that 
transplant centers and OPOs are private entities used by the OPTN to transmit 
information concerning its own programs.  This policy would affect the constitutional 
rights of potential recipients rather than OPTN members, and potential recipients are 
neither government speakers nor entities used by the government to transmit information.  
Thus, an OPTN policy prohibiting its members from transplanting solicited organs is also 
unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge.     
iii. The OPTN may be able to prohibit its members from facilitating 
donations directed toward solicitors on the basis of the 
relationship between the donor and the designated recipient.  
In contrast to an OPTN policy that focuses on the actions of the designated 
recipient, an OPTN policy against donors directing donations to solicitors, if carefully 
drafted, may withstand a constitutional challenge.  This policy would state that member 
transplant centers and OPOs cannot allow deceased donors, or families of deceased 
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donors to make directed donations to individuals with whom the deceased donor has had 
no preexisting relationship with before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first 
identified.  This would prevent the allocation of organs to individuals whom the donor or 
donor family came into contact with solely for the purpose of facilitating an organ 
donation, without infringing the right to make directed donations to family members, 
friends, and others with whom the donor had previous emotional ties to.154 The OPTN 
may be able to condition transplant center and OPO membership on compliance with 
such a policy.  There is certainly a potential enforcement issue given that it may be 
difficult to define or discern a “preexisting relationship.”  But, it is clear that in cases of 
pure solicitation there is no “preexisting relationship.”  Thus, such a policy may 
effectively prevent directed donations that result from deceased organ solicitation.  
 This policy would likely not violate the unconstitutional condition doctrine because 
the OPTN would not be conditioning benefits on a recipient’s exercise of the right to free 
speech.155 Regardless of whether the patient solicited, he would still have access to 
organs from the OPTN/UNOS system and transplantations from Medicare funded centers 
for any organs received from the OPTN or from a directed donation made in the presence 
a preexisting relationship.  The OPTN would not be directly or indirectly regulating 
protected speech because recipients who solicit would not lose any benefits that they 
otherwise would have otherwise had based on the solicitation.    
 Similarly, OPOs and transplant centers would make the distinction on the basis of 
whether there was a preexisting relationship, and not on whether the recipient exercised 
 
154 One recent proposal would allow directed donations made within blood relationships and marriage but 
would require OPTN approval on a case by case basis for all other directed donations.  Zink, Examining the 
Potential Exploitation of UNOS Policies, Am. J. Bioethics at 9-10.           
155 See supra text accompanying notes 143-152 (discussing the unconstitutional condition doctrine).   
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the constitutional right to free speech.  Such a policy would not limit a recipient’s right to 
engage in free speech.  Instead, it would limit a donor’s ability to direct a donation.  A 
donor’s right to direct a donation to a stranger can hardly be considered a valuable 
government benefit in the same way that access to organs from the OPTN system and 
access to federally funded transplant centers can be.  For these reasons, such a policy 
would likely pass an unconstitutional condition challenge. 
 
iv. An OPTN policy preventing its members from facilitating 
deceased directed donations made in the absence of a preexisting 
relationship would not fatally conflict with state or federal law.
Federal regulations and many state anatomical gift statutes expressly authorize 
directed organ donations from both living and deceased donors.156 For example, the 
UAGA states that an anatomical gift may be made to “a designated individual for 
transplantation or therapy needed by that individual.”157 Nonetheless, there would be no 
true conflict between these laws and an OPTN policy against member transplant centers 
and OPOs facilitating directed donations made in the absence of a preexisting 
relationship between the deceased donor and the designated recipient.  
Federal regulations and state anatomical gift statutes that permit directed donation 
do not create any legal duty for transplant centers or OPOs to agree to facilitate any 
particular directed donation.158 These laws specify what entities a donor may name as 
the donee of an anatomical gift, but do grant either the donor or the designated recipient 
the right to conscript transplant centers and OPOs into their services to effectuate the 
 
156 See supra notes 15-16. 
157 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a)(3).   
158 See discussion supra Part II.2 (A)-(B).  But, if an OPO undertakes coordination of a directed donation, 
the directed recipient may have an enforceable right to receive such organ.  See Colavito v. NY Donor 
Network, Inc. et al., 2nd Cir (Feb 23, 2006). 
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gift.159 A transplant center or OPO does not violate laws or regulations permitting 
directed donations by refusing to facilitate any particular directed donation.  Therefore, 
transplant centers and OPOs would be able to comply with an OPTN policy prohibiting 
facilitation of directed donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship without 
violating federal or state laws that permit directed donations generally.   
Under such a policy, the OPTN would be limiting the ability to direct a donation.  
This limitation may be appropriate and consistent with the legislative history; permitting 
directed donations to strangers was not the intention behind the UAGA directed donation 
provision.  The drafters of the UAGA never contemplated directed donations arranged 
through solicitations and made in the absence of any preexisting relationship.160 An 
OPTN policy prohibiting facilitation of deceased directed donation to strangers would 
only limit the right to direct a deceased donation in a way that the right was never 
intended to be exercised.  Thus, it is unlikely that a court would find that such a policy 
conflicts with the letter or the purpose of federal regulations and state laws that permit 
directed donation.161 
159 Id.
160 See supra note 29.   
161 Nevertheless, even if there was a perceived conflict, this OPTN policy would likely be enforceable.  
Although federal regulations expressly permit directed donation and require the Secretary of HHS to 
approve all OPTN policies, this HHS final rule may be unconstitutional to the extent that it conflicts with 
OPTN allocation policies because Congress granted the OPTN and not HHS the authority to set allocation 
policies.  See 42 C.F.R. § 121.4, 121.8(h); Chen, 49 Duke L.J. at 280, supra note 136.  Also, given that 
such a policy would not conflict with the purpose of the regulation permitting directed donation, there is 
little reason to think the Secretary would not approve it.  With regard to state law, if there was a conflict, 
the OPTN policy would preempt the state law through either conflict or field preemption to the extent that 
state laws permit directed donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship because Congress has 
authorized the OPTN to set national allocation policies under NOTA.  See supra n. 136.  NOTA was 
validly enacted under Congress’s spending power and its power to regulate interstate commerce.  See notes 
136-141 supra and accompanying text; but see Chen, 49 Duke L.J. at 281-282 (arguing that courts are 
reluctant to find that a private organization’s policies preempt state law and reluctant to find that a federal 
interest preempts and entire field of law).   
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e. Legislatively Restricting Directed Donations
A carefully drafted amendment to NOTA or to state anatomical gift statutes could 
effectively prevent directed donations to deceased organ solicitors and withstand a 
constitutional challenge.  Such a restriction could be written to prohibit directed donation 
to an individual with whom the deceased donor has had no preexisting relationship with 
before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first identified.  This would prevent 
deceased directed donations to individuals with whom the donor or donor family came 
into contact with solely for the purpose of facilitating a transplant, without affecting 
directed donation to family members or friends.162 Such a law might be challenged on 
the grounds of infringement of free speech, state/federal conflict of law principles, or 
substantive due process.  However, neither the free speech argument nor a conflict of 
laws challenge is likely to be successful as discussed above.   The substantive due process 
challenge merits a close look.   
 Generally, courts defer to legislatures and will only invalidate a law on substantive 
due process grounds if the law infringes a fundamental right.163 If a right is not 
enumerated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court often will only consider it 
fundamental if it is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.164 An important 
factor for determining whether a right is rooted in tradition is how broadly the right can 
be defined.   
 
162 It is possible to draft the law more broadly to prohibit all deceased directed donations.  See Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 18 § 5242(a), (d) (allowing only living donors to make a directed donation).  However, such a law 
would prohibit even deceased directed donations to family members and friends, which may be undesirable 
as a policy matter.   
163 U.S. v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).    
164 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).   
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 The right to direct an organ donation is not deeply rooted in the history and tradition 
of the nation.  Traditionally at common law, courts have found that at most, one has only 
a quasi-property right in one’s own tissues and only a limited right to direct burial and 
disposition in the body of a deceased family member.165 Also, most courts have refused 
to apply the traditional legal frameworks of property and contract law to organ 
transplantation cases when there is an applicable statute that has balanced the moral and 
social issues.166 Thus, the legal right to direct a donation as either a fundamental property 
or contract right is not likely to be considered deeply founded in our nation’s history and 
tradition.   It is statutory, and was created by state legislatures following the adoption of 
the UAGA in 1968.167 And, in fact, at least one state expressly prohibits directed 
deceased donation.168 
Of course, it may be possible characterize directed donation as a traditional right 
by more broadly defining it as the right to control the disposition of one’s body materials 
or remains.169 In Brotherton v. Cleaveland, the 6th Circuit and in Newman v. 
Sathyavaglswaran, the 9th Circuit found a fundamental right to control the final 
disposition of one’s body that extended to property interests of possession and transfer, 
and which was protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.170 
Defined this broadly, such a constitutional right would seem to prevent legislatures from 
limiting one’s ability to transfer an anatomical gift to an individual of one’s choosing. 
 
165 Perry v. St. Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan. 1995). But see discussion of Colavito,
supra at 42. 
166 Wilson v. Adkins, Ark. App. Div. 1 43, 48 (1997).   But see discussion of Colavito, supra at 42 in which 
the 2nd Circuit raises the issue of whether property law may apply to organ donation. 
167 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3 (1968) (amended 1987).   
168 See Supra note 14. 
169 Venner v. State, 30 Md. Spec. App. 599, 626 (1976). 
170 Brotherton v. Cleaveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991); Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 
786, 796 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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 Nevertheless, both the Brotherton and Newman cases related to a situation in which 
the state interfered with the rights of the next-of-kin by statutorily authorizing coroners to 
remove a deceased’s corneas without consent or even providing the next-of-kin notice.171 
Thus, the more narrow reading of these holdings is simply that the state cannot violate the 
next-of-kin’s property interest in a deceased’s body by taking a body part without 
obtaining consent.  Framed this way, the protected right seems to be a negative right to be 
free from interference with possession of property, not a positive right to demand that 
medical providers effectuate a transfer of property.   
 Although the Second Circuit in Colavito v. New York Donor Network, raises the 
question of whether the designated recipient of a directed donation has a property right in 
the directed organ, no court has found a fundamental legal right to transfer a body part to 
a specific person of one’s choosing.172 Defining the right to control the disposition of the 
body broadly enough to encompass such a right may have undesirable consequences.  For 
example, one would be able to argue that an organ donor has a fundamental legal right to 
place racial restrictions on a donation so that only certain races or classes of people could 
be recipients.  State laws such as the Florida statute that prohibits donors from placing 
discriminatory restrictions on potential recipients of an anatomical gift on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical handicap, health status, marital 
status, or economic status might be invalid.173 A right to place such discriminatory 
 
171 Id at 798.   
172 Colavito v. New York Donor Network (2nd Cir., February 23, 2006)(certifying questions back to the 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York including whether New York law vests directed donation 
recipients a property right in the directed organ). 
173 Fla. Stat. § 765.513(4) (2005).  The UNOS board of directors supports such laws.  See UNOS, Bioethics 
White Paper on Directed Donation, (April 1999), available at 
http://www.unos.org/resources/bioethics.asp?index=10.
44
restrictions on an organ donation is not traditional and has never been recognized as such 
at common law or in statute.174 
Congress and the states adopted NOTA and the UAGA before patients were 
publicly soliciting directed donations, and legislators probably only contemplated 
deceased directed donations made to family members, close friends, or others with whom 
the donor had emotional ties.175 Given this and the undesirable consequences of drawing 
the right more broadly, a court is likely to find that if there is a traditional legal right, it is 
defined only as the right to direct a donation to a family member or friend.  Thus, even if 
the right to direct a deceased donation could be construed as rooted in the nation’s history 
and tradition and therefore fundamental, the right to direct a donation to a stranger would 
likely fall outside of this right.  Therefore, a federal or state law that prohibits directed 
donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship would not violate substantive due 
process and would withstand a constitutional challenge.  
V. Conclusion
Lawmakers and healthcare providers should continue to permit solicitations of 
directed donations from living organ donors because this practice will increase total 
organ donations without depriving any potential recipients of organs they otherwise 
would have received or compromising an established allocation system.  In contrast, 
solicitations of directed donations from deceased donors should be restricted because 
such donations unjustifiably sacrifice medical utility and are inequitable in that they favor 
patients with “attractiveness,” wealth, and the ability to draw media attention.  Public 
 
174 There has never been a right to direct a donation to a class of people because statutes define directed 
donation as donation to a “designated individual.”  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a)(3). 
175 See supra note 29.   
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solicitations threaten to undermine the national system which is carefully established to 
equitably and efficiently allocate deceased organs.   
An outright ban on deceased organ solicitations may not be desirable and is not 
likely to withstand a constitutional challenge because charitable solicitations are 
protected under the first amendment as free speech.  However, intrusive organ 
solicitations for a directed donation can and should be subject to reasonable regulations, 
such as restrictions on the information contained in organ solicitations and the time, 
place, and manner in which solicitations are made.  Additionally, transplant centers 
should carefully consider whether they wish to adopt a policy restricting transplants on 
recipients who solicit deceased organs.  Organ Procurement Organizations should also 
carefully consider adoption of any policy refusing to facilitate deceased organ donations 
directed in the absence of a preexisting relationship.  Most importantly, the Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) likely has Congressional authority to 
prevent member OPOs and transplant centers from facilitating deceased directed 
donations made in the absence of a preexisting relationship between the donor and the 
designated recipient; and this may be the most politically expedient solution to the issue.  
Finally, Congress and states have the power to enact a statutory ban on deceased directed 
donations made in the absence of a preexisting relationship.  Lawmakers, UNOS and its 
member OPOs and Transplant Centers, as well as healthcare providers should consider 
all of these options to limit donors and donor families from directing deceased organ 
donations to solicitors.  The integrity of the national organ allocation system as a 
mechanism to maximize utility and equity of a scarce resource and the thousands of 
people awaiting a fair chance at receiving life saving transplants depend on it.   
